One immediate thing is to note that the rational insolubility of disagreement is not a plausible constraint to a satisfactory theory of profound disagreement. Let`s be clear about what that might mean. Note that “rational insolubility” is multiplying ambiguously: we might bear in mind that (i) there is no epistoographically rational way to resolve differences of opinion; or that (ii) there is no practically rational way to resolve differences of opinion; or that (iii) differences of opinion cannot be resolved by argument and exchange of reasons (. B, for example, rational paradigmatic methods or ways to resolve disputes). See Fogelin 2005  for this view. In the first case, an epistem aromatically rational resolution is simply the attitude they should adopt in terms of ice theory on content on which they disagree (cf. Feldman 2005). For example, given their differences of opinion, it could be that they should be accommodating, tovalue their confidence; or they may be allowed to maintain their trust. The second case can be interpreted as the modus operandi they should, given their practical reasons, because of their differences of opinion (see Lynch 2016). And in the third case, it records the impossibility of reaching an agreement by rational arguments. It should also be noted that if “rational insolubility” means deep disagreement, there are no purely argumentative reasons for resolving the disagreement, this clearly does not preclu her being resolved in a virtually rational, even rational way. This conclusion would only be followed if arguments or exchanges and the assessment of reasons were the only rational way to resolve disputes. Lynch (2010) himself does not seem to support the fundamental theory of the epistemic principle of so-called deep disagreements, but a stronger version of it.
The strongest version assumes that S and S are deeply divided on P only if P is a fundamental epistemtic principle, and the following condition applies: “Non-arbitration: there is no other epistemical principle that is accepted by both parties [S and S]that would put an end to the disagreement” (Lynch 2010, p. 265 my addition). Fourth, their disagreement is persistent. Intuitively, even if they are in principle able to reach agreement on the subjects on which they disagree, it is difficult to see how they will be able to achieve this result by recognizing each other`s reasons for their opinions. If, for example, Henry has ever invoked a religious reason to believe that the earth was created by God less than 6,000 years ago, this will probably not induce Richard to adopt his point of view, and vice versa. This is remarkably different from the usual differences of opinion. Suppose Johnny and Maria are divided on what the bill should be after dinner, and Mary is right about the total amount. Footnote 4 If Johnny thinks the total bill should be $20, but Maria thinks it`s supposed to be $22, the reproduction of his reasoning can intuitively push to change his beliefs.