In May, the United States tightened trade restrictions on China, requiring semiconductor manufacturers using U.S. equipment to obtain a special license to sell to companies or “entities” blacklisted by the United States. Chinese network giant Huawei tops the list of U.S. companies. It is also important to consider the progress made in promoting open trade as an autonomous economic policy. The Clinton administration`s record in trade is very strong – perhaps not compared to the ideal of the free trade economist, but certainly compared to previous governments that have faced similar political constraints. While the government`s early rhetoric may have been interpreted as an advantage for results-oriented trade, the balance sheet is indeed the most important in forging open market agreements and quite respectable in managing trade disputes and remedial measures. In any case, the trade record of the 1990s is accumulating very well compared to the 1980s, despite the polarization of domestic political debate. A combination of factors has contributed to this success, including the U.S.
economic resurgence and changing attitudes toward trade in Latin America and other developing countries, but President Clinton and the extraordinary group of people he has chosen for trade policy must pay some tribute. The 1990s opened a defensive snag with the United States on competitiveness and a broad political consensus on the need for the United States to be more aggressive in promoting its trade interests. This attitude changed dramatically over the decade, when the United States regained its international dominance in sectors that have formed as engines of growth and macroeconomic performance. By the late 1990s, America had established one of the most impressive records in decades on the exchange of trade agreements with important regional and bilateral partners and on the management of the multilateral trading system, which has a profound impact on economic and foreign policy. Second, foreign smelters are encouraged to “design” and avoid the purchase of U.S. semiconductor manufacturing facilities, so that these purchases are not targeted and disrupted in the future. Japanese or Dutch suppliers of competing equipment are suddenly more attractive to these companies. The limitation of U.S. semiconductor exports in 2019, which has proven “widespread” from other countries, has posed a dilemma for the Trump administration. It found that its unilateral restrictions on the protection of national security were ineffective and eliminated.
Or it could make them more efficient by working with other governments to limit the export of chips from their factories. The latest government restrictions do more than close technology exports to China. The policy limits some U.S. sales to third countries, even if they are U.S. military allies. U.S. semiconductor manufacturers, for example, cannot sell their equipment to large semiconductor manufacturers in South Korea or Taiwan if companies want to use U.S. tools to sell something to sell to Huawei, the Chinese telecommunications company, which is targeted by the government as a threat to national security. Comparing the trade vote counts in the 1990s, the most important factor, which distinguishes success from failure, is whether there were predictable concrete benefits that were sufficient to mobilize supporters. A simple comparison does the trick.
In 1997, when there was no trade agreement, the fast track procedure failed in Parliament, but in 1994, while Uruguay Round`s hard-won gains remained unresolved, the vote in the House of Representatives was 295 votes to 125, with 59% of Democrats in favour. Similarly, despite the unpopularity of trade votes in 2000, China`s vote on the NRNP was concluded in 2000 because of the strength of the underlying trade agreement with China. “We